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The efficient control by the banking sector’s supervising authorities of the methodologies 
adopted by banks in the measurement of their assets’ risks is a key determinant of solvency. 
Such task has stressed the need to evolve and adopt improved techniques, contained in the 
Basle Accord II, for the calculation of minimum levels of own funds that individual banks 
have to guarantee in order to safeguard the risks incurred in their activities.  
The assessment of the suitability of the minimum solvency ratio, currently of 8%, for the 
Portuguese banking sector, is the aim of this empirical research, developed with techniques of 
multivariate analysis (factorial analysis, clusters analysis and canonical correlations analysis) 
to classify and condense data in a multidimensional context. These techniques allowed the 
study of the relationships between banks’ economic and financial performance and their 
levels of solvability, as well as the hierarchical segmentation of the banking sector, which 
uncovered the existing asymmetries of credit quality, dimension and solvability. 
The study suggests that the minimum solvency ratio is not adequate, given the variety of 
banking institutions operating in Portugal, and that a differentiation, respecting the identified 
clusters and the distinct levels of risk, is needed to enhance solvability.  




1. STUDY PRESENTATION 
 
Financial institutions in general and banking in particular, are specialized in risk-taking and 
can only survive if they make an adequate risk management. A proper risk assessment is a 
key aspect of the bank solvency. Therefore is natural the Portuguese authority´s concern 
oversight on this issue and the efforts developed in order to align our system with 
international best practices, considering the Basel Accord II. 
The performance of the banking sector affects country´s economy and occupies a prominent 
place in the concerns of depositors, investors, analysts, managers, regulators and 
governmental institutions. In fact, a decrease in the level of confidence in any of these entities 
may result in a sudden run on deposits, causing a banking crisis with effects increasingly 
extended. 
The supervising authority tries to make an effective control over the levels of financial 
system solvency, in order to ensure that it achieves the minimum stipulated in terms of the 
relationship between capital and risk-weighted assets. The pursuit of this objective led Banco 
de Portugal to give the Instruction No. 15/2007 on the ICAAP (Internal Capital Adequacy 
Assessment Process), which establish rules for the evaluation and accurate determination of 
the level of internal capital, underlying risk profile of each institution. As a consequence 
banks with higher rates of failure have a higher level of internal capital. 
Given the relevance of this question, the supervision authority has to ensure that the financial 
system meets the minimum stipulated solvency. Considering that the level of risk must be 
understood as a subjective factor, it’s becomes relevant to analyze in this work the adequacy 
of the indicator minimum 8% solvency to the reality of the Portuguese banking institutions. 
To achieve this goal, we developed this research in two steps: (i) to select homogeneous 
subgroups to identify profiles, through which it is possible to characterize the banks both in 
dimension and level of credit quality (ii) to analyze the impact of solvency ratio in the 
organization of the clusters identified above. 
 
The base of the first stage relies on the implementation of the LACP, with SPSS 16, to reduce 
the initial set of variables (characterizing the bank´s dimension and credit quality) only in two 
components. It is possible by cluster analysis, to obtain homogeneous groups of banks with 
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similar characteristics in terms of dimension and credit quality. It is possible, even not 
considering the solvency ratio, to analyze how banks are grouped according to their 
characteristics of credit quality and dimension. As it will be demonstrated below, we can 
reach a reduction in the number of clusters, over the six years under review, that show the 
trends of increasing concentration in certain sectors of banking activity. 
 
With these data, we analyze the impact of the indicator of solvency in the formation of the 
indicated groups using the analysis of canonical correlations. It was verified that over the six 
years some banks appear isolated. These institutions have very high solvency ratios, are very 
specialized and have high credit risks, targeting a population with extremely specific 
characteristics. Given the diversity of agents operating in the country should be asked a 
universal indicator of solvency. In fact, higher the risk, higher it should be the requirements 
of the supervisory authority with regards to the solvency indicator. 
 
1.1. Population Target 
 
The population target was defined by a directed non-probability sample of twenty banks 
listed in the table below, and operating over a time horizon of six years (from 2002 to 2007) 
in the Portuguese market. These banks represent approximately 98% of the domestic banking 
sector in Portugal. 
BANK Sigla de Identificação 
Banco Comercial Português BCP 
Banco Português de Investimento BPI 
Banco Espírito Santo BES 
Banco Santander SANT 
Caixa de Crédito Agrícola  SIC 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos CGD 
Banif BAN 
Finibanco  FIN 
Montepio Geral  MON 
Banco Português de negócios BPN 
Banco Popular Portugal  BP 
Banco Bilbau Vizcaya Portugal BBV 
Banco Mais BMA 
Banco de Investimento Global BIG 
Banco Finantia FINA 
Banco Cetelem CET 
Banco Itaú Europa ITA 
Banco Africano de Investimentos BAI 





1.2. Variables Selection  
 
This study is based on data collected in the Annual Reports and Accounts for the years 2002 





1. Total Assets 
2. Equity 
3. Credit 
4. Staff expenses 
5. Net Profit 
6. Tangible Asset 




1. CVCC: Default credit/ Total Credit 




1. ROE: Return on Equity 
2. ROA: Return on Assets 
3. CVCC:  Default credit/ Total Credit 
4. IPCV: (Impairment/Provisions) / Total Credit 
5. CPPB: Staff Expenses/ Bank Product 
6. CTin: Cost income ratio 




1. RS:  Solvability Ratio 





2. STUDY DEVELOPMENT 
 






    SPSS 16.0 









Based on the first and second set of variables selected for this study (consisting of nine 
variables that characterize the dimension and credit quality of banks), using the FAPC 
(Factorial Analysis of Principal Components) with the SPSS 16 software. The purpose of this 
procedure is to reduce the original set of variables to a smaller set of components, assuring 
the characteristics of the original variables. The aim is to reduce the initial variables in two 
components (Object Score 01 and Object Score 02). 
 
After obtaining the two components, we can present it in a two-dimensional representation 
for easy reading. The choice of FAPC is justified by the fact that it is a exploratory 
multivariate analysis technique that transforms a set of correlated variables into a smaller set 



















The goal of the second stage of the study is to classify the banks under review, according to 
the Object Score obtained in the first step. To this end, we resort to cluster analysis as it 
allows the organization of a group of individuals for which information is known. The aim is 
to form homogeneous groups of banks, according to its characteristics in terms of dimension 














                                                            
 
                                                      
                                                                                                                       
                                                        




In this step, we analyze the relationship between the economic and financial performance of 
banks with the solvability variables. Thus, based on the third and fourth set of variables, 
consisting respectively of seven and two variables, we developed a canonical correlation 
analysis.  
 
This method deals with the relationship between a set of independent variables and a set of 
dependent variables. The aim is to find the scores for each sample in a two-dimensional space 
(canonical scores), obtained through the statistically significant canonical function. Based on 
the two object scores obtained in the first stage, and the canonical score obtained in this step, 




























                                                                       







We intend to perform a hierarchical segmentation of banks, using the same procedures and 
criteria used in the second stage. Now, the main goal is to form homogeneous groups of 
banks, according to its characteristics in terms of solvency, dimension and credit quality. 
 
3. STUDY RESULTS 
 
 
Then are present the Clusters Obtained: 
 

















































































































   
 Ano 2002 
With Solvability Without Solvability 
 
Cluster 1: FINANTIA, BAI, CETELEM e CREDIFIN 
Cluster 2: SANTANDER e BPI 
Cluster 3: FINIBANCO, BMAIS, SICAM, BPN, 
BBVA, BES, BIG, DB, BANIF, BP e MONTEPIO 
Cluster 4: ITAU 
Cluster 5: CGD e BCP 
 
Cluster 1: FINANTIA, BAI, CETELEM e 
CREDIFIN 
Cluster 2: SANTANDER e BPI 
Cluster 3: FINIBANCO, SICAM, BES, BPN, 
DB, BANIF, BP, BBVA  e  MONTEPIO  
Cluster 4: BIG 
Cluster 4: CGD e BCP 
Cluster 5: BMAIS 
Cluster 6: ITAU 
 
Ano 2003 
With Solvability Without Solvability 
 
Cluster 1: FINANTIA, BAI, CETELEM, BMAIS, 
FINIBANCO, MONTEPIO, SICAM, BPN, BANIF, 
BBVA, DB, BIG e BP 
Cluster 2: ITAÚ 
Cluster 3: CREDIFIN 
Cluster 4: SANTANDER, BPI e BES 
Cluster 5: CGD e BCP 
 
Cluster 1: FINIBANCO, CETELEM, 
MONTEPIO, FINANTIA e SICAM 
Cluster 2: BBVA, DB, BANIF e BP 
Cluster 3: BPN e BIG 
Cluster 4: SANTANDER, BPI e BES 
Cluster 5: CREDIFIN e BAI 
Cluster 6: CGD e BCP 
Cluster 7: BMAIS 
Cluster 8: ITAU 
 
Ano 2004 
With Solvability Without Solvability 
 
Cluster 1: BMAIS, CETELEM, FINANTIA, BAI, 
SICAM e CREDIFIN 
Cluster 2: BIG, DB, BBVA, BP, BPN, BANIF, 
 
Cluster 1: BBVA, DB, BANIF, BP, 
MONTEPIO, FINIBANCO e BPN 




FINIBANCO e MONTEPIO 
Cluster 3: ITAÚ 
Cluster 4: SANTANDER, BPI e BES 
Cluster 5: CGD e BCP 
Cluster 3: FINANTIA, CETELEM, SICAM e 
BAI 
Cluster 4: CREDIFIN 
Cluster 5: BES, CGD e BCP 
Cluster 6: BMAIS e BIG 
Cluster 7: ITAÚ 
 
Ano 2005 
With Solvability Without Solvability 
 
Cluster 1: FINANTIA, BAI, CETELEM, BMAIS, 
FINIBANCO, MONTEPIO, SICAM, BPN, BANIF, 
BBVA, ITAU, BP e CREDIFIN 
Cluster 2: BIG 
Cluster 3: CGD e BCP 
Cluster 4: SANTANDER, BPI e BES 
 
Cluster 1: BPN, DB, BANIF, MONTEPIO, BP, 
CETELEM, FINIBANCO e BBVA 
Cluster 2: SANTANDER, BPI e BES  
Cluster 3: CREDIFIN, BAI, SICAM, FINANTIA 
e BMAIS 
Cluster 4: CGD e BCP 
Cluster 5: ITAU 
Cluster 6: BIG 
 
Ano 2006 
With Solvability Without Solvability 
 
Cluster 1: FINANTIA, BAI, CETELEM, CREDIFIN, 
FINIBANCO, BMAIS, SICAM, BPN, BBVA, BIG, 
DB, BANIF, BP, ITAU e MONTEPIO 
Cluster 2: SANTANDER , BPI e BES 
Cluster 3: CGD e BCP 
 
Cluster 1: BBVA, DB, BP, CETELEM, BANIF, 
FINIBANCO, BPN, FINANTIA, e MONTEPIO  
Cluster 2: BAI 
Cluster 3: SICAM e BMAIS  
Cluster 4: BIG e ITAU 
Cluster 5: BES e SANTANDER 
Cluster 6: CGD e BCP 
Cluster 7: BPI 
Cluster 8: CREDIFIN 
 
Ano 2007 
With Solvability Without Solvability 
 
Cluster 1: FINANTIA, BAI, CETELEM, BMAIS, 
FINIBANCO, CREDIFIN, ITAU, BIG, MONTEPIO, 
SICAM, BPN, BANIF, BBVA, DB, e BP 
Cluster 2: SANTANDER e BPI 
Cluster 3: BES, BCP e CGD 
 
Cluster 1: BPN, FINIBANCO, BP, BANIF, 
MONTEPIO, CETELEM, DB e FINANTIA 
Cluster 2: CREDIFIN, BAI, BMAIS e SICAM 
Cluster 3: BPI 
Cluster 4: BES, BCP e CGD 
Cluster 5: SANTANDER 
Cluster 6: BBVA, ITAU  
Cluster 7: BIG 
 
   
 
 
After grouping the institutions of the financial system according to their dimension and credit 
quality (credit defaults), it was possible to verify a reduction in the number of clusters, which 
decreased from five in 2002 to just three in 2007. The third cluster includes the three largest 
banks, the second is made up of the two institutions of medium/large dimension and the first 




The initial identification of clusters, made in the first and second stages of the study, is 
complemented with an extensive analysis of solvability variables. It was found that, in some 
years, the identified clusters did not change significantly. However, there is a new scenario 
with a large number of outliers. Some of the institutions that had previously integrated a 
cluster then appeared as isolated institutions in other words (no longer as part of a cluster) as 
a result of solvability variables. 
 
The comparison of clusters with and without solvability variables enabled us to observe a 
change in the position of banks in the clusters. This revealed a mismatch between the level of 
risk of the institution and its solvability indicator. If one compares 2002 to 2007, one can 
notice that in 2002 there were no major changes in the formation of clusters, except in the 
cases of BMAIS and BIG, which became outliers as a consequence of the atypical solvability 
ratios. Thus, in 2002, one can observe a match between the evident risk level of the financial 
institutions and their solvability indicator. In the case of the last year considered in this study 
only the cluster made up of larger institutions (BES, CGD and BCP) remained the same. In 
the other clusters there was not such correspondence between the institutions’ risk level and 
their solvability. 
 
If we analyze the six years in study, one can notice that solvency ratios were of 8% in the 
case of institutions such as CGD, 20% in the case of institutions like BMAIS, or ITAU, or up 
to 30% in the case of BIG, which shows a lack of correlation between dimension and the 
solvability indicator. What one can notice is a possible relationship between high solvability 
ratios and atypical and / or highly specialized institutions, whose risk levels are much higher 
than the average, as we can see in the provided examples. 
 
A large cushion of capital, well above the minimum required by the supervising authority, 
results mainly from these institutions’ need to safeguard higher risk levels or from the 
difficulty in quantifying them. This situation can be justified by the low diversity of their 
assets and by the fact that they specialize in very limited business areas. Thus, they seek to 
strengthen their solvency ratio as a result of internal management decisions and not by 
imposition of the supervising authority. In this context, as these institutions’ solvability ratios 
are higher than the required minimum (even though they could operate with ratios of only 
8%), one can consider that the current supervision system does not promote the necessary 
stability of banking institutions because it does not distinguish different types of banks with 




Due to the large number of agents operating in the country, in terms of dimension, credit 
quality and solvability, the idea of a common solvability ratio should be questioned by the 
supervising authority. This indicator should be adequate to the reality of each institution. If 
this does not happen, the role of the supervising authority may become weaker. 
 
Considering what was mentioned above, it is highly recommended that the supervising 
authorities control not only the minimum solvability ratio of 8% but also its adequateness to 
the risk level of each institution. Therefore, one can stress the importance of this study, which 
enabled the grouping of banks in clusters according to their dimension, credit quality and 
solvability. 
 
Also Boucinha (2007) states in his study that, although own founds are the most expensive 
source of funding, in general terms, banks must maintain solvability ratios well above the 
required minimum, ie banks with the highest risk must hold higher capital reserves. 
  
In his study Boucinha proves that higher capital reserves are a significant tool to avoid their 
insolvency. However, larger banks are the ones that tend to be less concerned with their 
cushion of capital due to the fact that they feel to be somehow more protected by the 
supervisory authority. The results confirm the idea that banks adjust their capital reserves in 






As a result of the first two phases, one can conclude that the number of clusters initially 
identified decreased over time, revealing increasing stability and consistency and reflecting 
an apparent concentration of certain banking sectors. In the last year of this study, the twenty 
institutions included in the sample were grouped in only three clusters, two of which 
comprising only five institutions, which represent over 70% of the banking product sector. 
The remaining fifteen institutions, which specialize mainly in consumer credit activities, are 
grouped into a third cluster of little relevance in our financial banking system. 
 
These results suggest that in the period under review, the Portuguese banking system has, , 
evidenced increasing concentration, and there is a trend for large groups to absorb some less 
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competitive institutions. However, the study indicates that there are exceptions regarding the 
concentration trend, which may be justified by the fact that some smaller institutions are of 
little interest to larger ones, because they are institutions which specialize in very specific 
areas with higher risk levels. That is the case of BIG, BMAIS, CETELEM and ITAU. 
 
The introduction of the solvency indicator in cluster analysis led to some significant changes, 
including the changes in the position of banks in clusters, suggesting a mismatch between the 
risk level of each institution and its solvability indicator. Moreover, it became evident that the 
solvability ratio is not associated with dimension criteria, because some institutions of large 
dimension present a solvability ratio of only 8% (e.g. CGD and BCP) and there are some 
small institutions with solvability ratios of approximately 30% (e.g. ITAU and BIG). What 
one can notice is the possible existence of a relationship between high solvability ratios and 
atypical institutions specialized in very specific areas. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
cases in which solvability ratios are approximately 20% or 30% (which can be identified as 
outliers) result from the need of some institutions to protect themselves from higher risk 
levels, which are usually uncertain and difficult to quantify. 
  
However, according to the supervising authority, these institutions could operate with a ratio 
of only 8%. So one can conclude that, on the one hand, higher cushions of capital do not 
provide more solvability to these institutions; on the other hand, it becomes evident that the 
minimum ratio of 8% is not suitable to all institutions, due to the fact that they decide to 
operate with higher solvability ratios levels as a result of internal management policies. 
 
This study leads us to conclude that the minimum value of the solvability ratio should be 
established by the supervising authority considering the characteristics of each institution. 
The higher the possibility of risk variation, the more demanding the supervising institution 
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